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Security of an Ill-Posed Operator for Image Authentication
Yongdong Wu and Robert H. Deng
Abstract—This letter analyzes the security of an image authen-
tication scheme which exploits the instability of an ill-posed oper-
ator. Since the ill-posed operator produces only a limited number
of authentic images regardless of the number of watermarks, an
attacker can impersonate an image owner to generate authentic
images at a high probability. Our experiments demonstrate that
our attack is both practical and effective.
Index Terms—Image authentication, random forgery.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N A watermarking-based authentication scheme, an unau-thorized party is not supposed to produce any fake image
that can be recognized as authentic by a verifier. Cryptographic
primitives have been introduced to authenticate images in many
watermarking schemes (e.g., [1]). Recently, an ill-posed oper-
ator is used for image authentication due to its high sensitivity
to small changes in the input data [2]. Izquierdo et al. [3] ap-
plied a highly ill-conditioned matrix to interrelate a watermark
with the original image to provide image authentication. To cope
with images of large sizes, Izquierdo et al. suggested to divide
an image into blocks as in [4] and watermark each block inde-
pendently. To defend against vector quantization attack (VQA)
[5] which collages the blocks from different authentic images,
watermarking parameters in [3] are chosen to be block-wise de-
pendent.
In the original ill-posed operator-based scheme [3], pixels of a
watermarked image are real numbers. For practical reasons, we
need to transform real-value watermarked images into integer
images. Due to computation precision limitation and the integer
transformation, the scheme in [3] produces a small number of
authentic images regardless of the number of watermarks. Thus,
an attacker can impersonate an image owner to fake authentic
images at a high probability.
The rest of this letter is organized as follows. Section II in-
troduces the ill-posed operator-based scheme given in [3]. Sec-
tion III analyzes its security. Simulation results are shown in
Section IV. A conclusion is drawn in Section V.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ILL-POSED OPERATOR FOR IMAGE
AUTHENTICATION
Throughout this letter, denotes an original image
which has bit planes, i.e., its pixel values are in the integer
interval . In the following, all the image (block) op-
erations are matrix operations unless stated otherwise. is as-
sumed to have nonzero singular values (SVs).
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is an watermark which is generated from a secret
known to the owner and the verifier only. is assumed to have
nonzero SVs whose smallest value is a tiny positive number .
If the original image is too large, is partitioned into
small blocks which are watermarked independently. Thus, to
simplify the presentation, we merely consider watermarking on
the whole image directly. To make the paper self-contained,
in the following we introduce the two modules of the ill-posed
operator-based scheme [3]: the watermarking module and the
verifying module.
A. Watermarking
An original image is decomposed as , where
and are orthogonal matrices, is the transpose of matrix
, and is a diagonal matrix,
. For the sake of simplicity, we have
organized the SVs of in an order different from that of [3].
To generate an authentic watermarking image:
A1) Build a family of matrices
where and
. Suppose has nonzero SVs.
A2) Given a predefined threshold , calculate the parameter
such that
(1)
where is the computation precision, is the
th nonzero SV of , is the column of the
matrix formed with the right singular vectors of [3],
i.e., , is a vector for defeating VQA,
and is a large secret number.
A3) Construct the watermarked image
(2)
where , i. e., .
B. Verifying
In [3], the parameters , , and computation precision are
public parameters, but and are secret parameters. In order
to verify an image , the verifier obtains the secrets and ,
then:
B1) Construct . Suppose that the number of
nonzero SVs of is .
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B2) Calculate
B3) If , is authentic, otherwise, it is forged.
The public parameter is used to tolerate the computa-
tion deviation.
III. RANDOM FORGERY
Without loss of generality, suppose images are processed in
pixel domain, and the pixels of , , and are in an integer
interval . For example, each pixel value is in the in-
teger interval [0, 255] for an 8-bit gray image. To meet this prac-
tical requirement, we supply two embedding steps. These steps,
however, forces the ill-posed operator-based scheme to generate
a small number of authentic images for an original image. This
makes the scheme vulnerable to a random forgery attack.
A. Integer Transformation
In [3], all the arithmetic operations are in real number domain.
Due to the computation deviation and the modification on the
smallest SV , the elements in may not fall in the integer
interval in (2). Since a real-value watermarked image
requires more storage/bandwidth, it should be transformed into
an integer-value image for practical considerations. Continuing
with the watermarking step in Section II-A, the necessary steps
for the integer transformation are:
A4) for all , , if , ; if ,
;
A5) round all the elements of .
B. Principle of Random Forgery
In order to provide sufficient security, the number of water-
marked images for an original image must be very large. Oth-
erwise, anyone may impersonate the owner of an “authentic”
image at a nonnegligible probability. For example, if there are
only five possible watermarked images for an original image,
a valid watermarked image can be generated by anyone with a
probability of 0.2.
For clarity, denote as the set of authentic images.
Because an error tolerance threshold is used to reduce false
rejection rate (FRR), many values in correspond
to the same authentic image in . Suppose the cardinality of
is , i.e., watermarked images are generated from an
original image. Since an authentic image generated from a gen-
uine owner is in , an attacker can randomly select a SV from
to fabricate a watermarked image with proba-
bility lower bounded by . Therefore, if the cardinality of
is small, the security strength of the authentication scheme
is weak.
C. Cardinality of
The cardinality of is mainly determined by the computa-
tion precision and the integer transformation. The effect of the
former is trivial and will be shown in our simulation results in
Section IV. In the following we study the effect of integer trans-
formation. Clearly, the cardinality of is limited by the in-
terval . Assume that the watermarked image
is not tampered with, i.e., . We denote
.
.
.
.
.
.
Hence, the difference matrix between the inspected (water-
marked) image and the original image is
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
(3)
In (3), (or ) is approximated to (or respectively)
because the (integer) modification is small due to supplemental
Steps A4) and A5) in Section III-A. Since and are or-
thonormal matrices, we have , , and ,
. Thus 1 if . In other
words, if , no watermark is embedded at all since
.
Define a sequence of sets as
where . The
elements in divide the interval into ( ) subintervals
, with each subinterval corresponding to one element
in . In other words, the cardinality of is .
Because , the cardinality of any is no more than
1round(X) rounds X to the nearest integer.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS FOR VIDEO TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 15, NO. 1, JANUARY 2005 163
Fig. 1. Error distribution in case of no tampering. The verifier should accept
many watermarked images so as to reduce false rejection rate.
. As a consequence, . Thus, an attacker has
the success forgery probability
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
Our simulations use the same set of parameters as that in the
experiments of [3], i.e., , , . The
objective here is to investigate the impact of computation pre-
cision and integer transformation on the cardinality of so
as to demonstrate the security weakness of the ill-posed oper-
ator-based scheme for image authentication [3].
A. Computation Precision
In this simulation of the computation precision, MATLAB
version 5.1 is used as a simulation tool, whose is
. The operation is executed in double precision (64 bits)
in Pentium 4. The process is as follows.
• Decompose an image as . Denote the op-
timal nonzero SV as according to step A2) (see Sec-
tion II-A). This step simulates the behavior of the image
owner.
• Multiply , , and together so as to obtain the “water-
marked” image . This step also simulates the behavior
of the owner.
• Decompose so as to obtain its smallest nonzero SV .
Clearly, is authentic because it is not tampered with.
This step simulates the behavior of the verifier.
With respect to Fig. 1, the difference is approximately
a normal distribution with mean and standard
deviation . Thus, in order to provide low FRR,
the verifier should regard all the as authentic if
. Consequently, the interval is divided into
subintervals of length . That is, the cardinality of
is roughly . As a result, an attacker can forge an
authentic image with probability of 10 given [3],
which is much higher than the probability of 10 by guessing
in [3].
B. Integer Transformation
As mentioned in Section III-A, it is usually impractical to as-
sign real-values to image pixels. However, if the integer trans-
formation is performed on each pixel, no pixel is
changed at all when . i.e., . On the other hand,
2 or 3 changes so many pixels that should be
large enough to guarantee low FRR. Even let the permission
threshold , the problem persists. On the other hand,
is required such that the order of SVs of the water-
marked image is the same as that of the original image. In our
experiments with the well known Lena image, .
In other words, we can not increase to increase the cardinality
of . Therefore, the cardinality of is very small and the
ill-posed operator-based scheme is vulnerable to the random
forgery attack.
V. CONCLUSION
The image authentication watermarking scheme in [3] is
based on the sensitivity of an ill-posed operator. However,
the scheme is vulnerable to an random attack. In this attack,
anyone can forge an “authentic” image with a high probability
because the number of possible authentic images is small.
This number is determined by the computation precision and
integer transformation. Computation error is always inevitable,
while integer transformation is necessary to map a real-value
authentic image into a practically useful image because a
real-value image wastes so much storage and bandwidth. If
only the computation precision is taken into consideration as
in [3], the security strength of the ill-posed operator-based
scheme is low. Furthermore, if an integer transformation is
performed, the number of possible authentic images is much
smaller, resulting in very weak security.
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2oor(X) roundsX to the nearest integers toward minus infinity.
3ceil(X) rounds X to the nearest integers toward infinity.
